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 EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY 
There are many firms that now engage in co-opetition projects, during which they have 
relationships with competitors that are simultaneously competitive and collaborative, in order to 
combine the advantages of both positions. However, co-opetition remains a risky strategy because 
of the opportunistic intentions of some of the participants. This study asks this original question : 
does the threat of opportunism grow with the scope f a co-opetition project? To answer this 
question, an empirical study of 106 French boating companies offers a descriptive and explanatory 
analysis of co-opetition and opportunism. The results of the study indicate that extended co-
opetition in several markets is particularly associated with the preparation and deployment of 
sanctions to deter opportunistic tendencies in co-opetitors. During co-opetition, firms are more 
vigilant in maintaining a competitive balance, particularly when the collective project environment 
is a complex one. 
 
 KEYWORDS 
 Multi-market and multi-point co-opetition, opportunism, sanctions. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Coined by Raymond Noorda in the 1980s, ‘co-opetition’ was a neologism that combined 
the words ‘competition’ and ‘co-operation’ and was intended to evoke the simultaneity of these 
two relationships between firms (Bengtsson & Kock, 1999). Until the 1990s, competition and 
collaboration were often seen as two opposing relation l modes. However, many competitors are 
now developing collaborative activities (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1995) and, therefore, 
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environmental co-opetition has become plural (Lacam & Salvetat, 2016). Co-opetition proceeds in 
a dyadic relationship within a network of multiple rivals that interact on one or more levels of their 
value chains, markets or territories, and is based on a partial congruence of interests and value 
creation (Kock, Nisuls, & Soderqvist, 2010 ; Padula & Dagnino, 2007). However, co-opetition 
remains a risky strategy because of the opportunism of some players (Luo, 2007). Bengtsson and 
Kock (1999) have highlighted the risk of a conflict of interest between co-opetitors when there is 
an inability to balance competition and co-operation. Faced with such a threat, financial and legal 
sanctions against opportunistic firms can be applied (Carpenter, Matthews, & Ong’ong’a, 2004). 
For Williamson (1985), however, such a mechanism does not provide sufficient security or 
governance and stems from the inability of firms to understand and anticipate all the intentions and 
actions of the other parties before and during an agreement. Moreover, a rigid system of governance 
may put co-operation at risk if co-opetitors perceive it as being too restrictive (Luo, 2007). Co-
operation can take various formats according to the ne ds of the stakeholders and the 
organizational, historical or cultural context of their relationship. However, although the literature 
has been concerned with various opportunistic actions that can occur during co-opetition, the link 
between the sectoral and geographic dimensions of a project and the instability of the co-opetitive 
relationship has not so far been addressed. The internationalization of co-opetition and the industry 
context deserves further consideration (Luo, 2007). It was thought to be interesting to consider the 
possible influence that the sectoral and geographic scope of the objectives of co-opetitors could 
have on the degree of rivalry as expressed through pportunism and the use of sanctions as a control 
instrument. 
Much of the research on co-opetition is conceptual and qualitative studies have focused on 
understanding the co-opetitive processes within a sgle company or a limited sample, often within 
technological markets (Depeyre & Dumez, 2007). However, according to a study by 
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PricewaterhouseCoopers (2012), the French boating industry is gradually developing collaborative 
policies to support actors in the defense of their local markets or the conquest of foreign ones. The 
market has certain favorable characteristics for the development of co-opetition. Therefore, this 
empirical study of 106 firms from a traditional market provides a descriptive analysis and an 
original and detailed explanation of the dual nature of co-opetition and the environmental 
determinants of opportunism sanctions. The results how that the risk of a return to confrontation 
between firms is particularly significant in co-opetition. Opportunistic risk requires the existence 
of a dissuasive sanction mechanism to maintain the co-operative effort of participants. More 
precisely, sanctions are prepared and applied particularly where co-opetition operates in a diverse 
(multi-market) and international (multi-point) environment. The complex environment of co-
opetition therefore changes the relationship between co-opetitors : the opportunities for being 
opportunistic are multiplied and the balance is weighted accordingly towards applying sanctions to 
opportunism. Thus, this study highlights the particular balance of power that is established between 
co-operation and competition in a sectorally and territorially extended project. In this context, 
deterrence proves to be a key mechanism for maintain g collaboration.  
 
THEORETICAL  BACKGROUND 
 
Co-opetition: An environmental strategy of an unstable nature 
According to Bengtsson and Kock (2000), four relational modes can bind rivals : 
competition, coexistence (a form of avoidance), co-operation and co-opetition. Competitors are 
defined as players in one or more markets (products/services) and points (territories) who struggle 
for scarce resources and/or produce and sell similar de ls to joint customers. Thus, competition 
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could involve a single market and territory (a single-market and single-point environment) or a 
complex environment that consists of several markets and territories (a multi-market and multi-
point environment) (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990). A co-operation or co-opetition relationship can 
also take place in a simple or complex environment, guided by the objectives of specialization or 
sector diversification and by national or international goals (Lacam & Salvetat, 2016).  
In contrast to a classical alliance, in which co-operative gives way to competitive behavior, 
co-opetition represents the coexistence of these relationships (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000). Several 
works in the literature highlight the value of a co-opetition strategy for combining the benefits of 
both co-operative and competitive relationships (e.g. Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997). Co-operation 
enables a firm to create greater business potential through collective value creation; at the same 
time, competition allows the firm to secure personal benefits at the expense of the other co-
opetitors. Co-opetition thus ensures competitive emulation and opposes all collusive practices: the 
relationship does not cancel competition, as it concer s, in any event, increasing market share at 
the expense of the consumer (Walley, 2007).  
Some competitors can, due to their presence in the same markets, identify and decide to 
manage many of the environmental events that they could not cope with alone. Gnyawali and Park 
(2009) point out that the majority of projects are carried out co-opetitively between competitors in 
the same market. Co-opetition between direct rivals may be motivated by access to resources and 
external expertise in order to strengthen their respective offers vis-à-vis their customers 
(Bengtsson, Wilson, Eriksson, & Wincent, 2010). The resources they have that are similar, such as 
their organizational routines and shared environment, facilitate understanding of their 
interdependence, connections and co-operation (Oxley & Sampson, 2004). Ritala and Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen (2009) point out that co-opetition can allow direct rivals to respond collectively to 
threats from common opponents through, for example, the combined efforts of innovation. Thus, 
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two French small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the Alu Marine and Nautitech shipyards, 
created a joint venture (Marine Development) to develop their respective ranges of catamarans. 
The approach utilizes a complex network composed of multiple members, which feeds collective 
efforts through a broad mobilization of resources, skills and knowledge (Padula & Dagnino, 2007). 
The distribution of profits between firms from the exchange, sharing or co-creation of assets can 
take place only during a project or continue after i s close after having reached an agreement 
(Clarke-Hill, Li, & Davies, 2003). Collaborations can be synergistic via the combination of 
identical or complementary resources (M'Chirgui, 2005). The combination of similar resources 
reduces the costs and risks of a proposed sectoral or territorial expansion through the realization of 
economies of scale. The additional commitment of resources promotes the collective creation of 
knowledge and innovation to support the development of new activities (Ritala & Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen, 2009). Benefits from a large network of assets may, therefore, renew or diversify the 
activities of co-opetitors in a dynamic and complex environment (Kock et al., 2010). Co-opetition 
can thus support an offensive strategy, and the divrsification and internationalization of the 
participants (Bengtsson et al., 2010). However, opportunistic behavior can emerge and be a 
motivation for undertaking co-opetition (M'Chirgui, 2005). Opportunism is involved in the dual 
and unstable nature of co-opetition, as this strategy is desirable for a firm preparing for future 
confrontation (Gnyawali & Park, 2009). Despite benevol nt motives at the start of a project, there 
is a strong propensity to compete in a collective project because co-operation increases individual 
competitiveness (Lado et al., 1997). Indeed, the success of co-operative work strengthens the 
competitive position of a company in new markets and territories shared with co-opetitors and thus 
extends their rivalry to being multi-sectoral and global. Co-opetition is used to ensure the 
establishment of a firm in a new market environment. After reaching this stage, the collective effort 
can be maintained with the emergence of individual and contradictory tendencies among the 
  
7 
 
participants. After obtaining the assets required for its establishment and growth, a company can 
then develop its aggressiveness due to its increasing independence vis-à-vis its co-opetitors. The 
objectives of the sectoral and geographic deployment of co-opetitors unbalance the competitive 
relationship and increase the chances of the emergence of opportunistic behavior. 
Hence, the following is hypothesized : 
H1 : The greater the environmental complexity of co-opetition, the greater the opportunism 
present during co-opetition. 
 
Sanctions as an instrument of control during co-opetition  
Co-operation requires balance and compromise between individual and collective interests, 
between the advantages of pooling and the risks of opportunism. The combination of co-operation 
and competition presents different types of co-opetition (Padula & Dagnino, 2007). Bengtsson and 
Kock (2000) developed a typology of co-opetitors that characterizes the dominant co-operative 
relations as competitive and balanced. Lado et al. (1997) and Luo (2007) reveal four co-opetitive 
relations through the simultaneity of strong co-operation and weak competition, strong co-
operation and strong competition, weak co-operation and strong competition, and, finally, weak 
co-operation and weak competition. Thus, firms that engage in collaboration face considerable 
moral hazard problems due to the unpredictable behavior of their allies and the likely costs of 
opportunistic actions taken by them (Williamson, 1985). Co-opetition poses several risks, such as 
the loss of strategic and specific resources for the projects of the firms that are left behind. The 
costs induced may outweigh the benefits of co-operation nd cause it to break down (Phelps, 2010). 
For example, protective mechanisms with regard to a c mpany’s own resources and skills might 
be established (Gnyawali & Park, 2009). The relationship can become unbalanced between co-
opetitors and thus strengthen opportunistic initiatives (M'Chirgui, 2005). This is competition in the 
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form of collective action (Luo, 2007), as the collaboration allows a firm to both reduce the 
asymmetry of resources and skills vis-à-vis its co-opetitors, and to understand their management 
precepts and better prepare for their next competitiv  actions. Co-opetition is, therefore, carried out 
with a high risk of opportunism (Clarke-Hill et al., 2003).  
To prevent or control the risk of opportunism, several forms of co-opetition control can be 
deployed (Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). As a form of social control, firms choose their 
co-opetitors and co-operate with them based on their relational networks. Their norms of 
reciprocity and trust in a common ground guide their s lection and regulate their relations. Social 
control is ensured during a project. Co-opetitors’ familiarity with each other promotes 
understanding and communication, but also the monitori g of behavior. A system of opportunism 
sanctions can also be deployed by firms (Carpenter et al., 2004). A reduction in rivalry can come 
from an awareness by companies of a collective ability to detect selfish behavior and enforce 
punishments. The interdependence among players in the same network can minimize the likelihood 
of a firm behaving opportunistically due to the implementation of monitoring and the high risk of 
a collective social sanction (Burt, 2000). Williamson (1985) refers to the pressure placed on 
corporate reputation as a key means of constraining opportunism. The sanction may also extend to 
exclusion from a network. The possibility of sanction serves to reassure firms that an unco-
operative ally could face losses during a collaborati n (Lado et al., 1997). Thus, formal control of 
co-opetition can be established through a consortium, joint venture, license, etc. (Luo, 2007). This 
control consists of bonds and organizational mechanisms of co-operation that detail the roles and 
responsibilities as well as the processes and results that are to be closely monitored. Such an 
agreement may consist of contractual guarantees that incorporate sanctions for non-compliant 
behavior (Williamson, 1985). Confidence may stem from the belief that costly sanctions would be 
applied and exceed the gains made from potential opportunistic behavior. The financial loss could 
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be enough to deter opportunism, but the moral cost may also be an important deterrent (i.e. loss of 
reputation or brand image caused by the other members of the same network). 
Hence, it is hypothesized that the proliferation of opportunistic action is accompanied by 
the propagation of sanctions : 
H2 : The greater the opportunism present during co-opetition, the more opportunism is 
sanctioned. 
 
The extent of environmental co-opetition in determining sanctions against 
opportunism 
If the gains from co-opetition come from a collaborative effort maintained despite 
simultaneous competition among its players, they can also come from opportunistic behavior 
favored by the sectoral scope and/or territory of aproject. For example, international co-opetition 
presents certain difficulties that differentiate it from domestic co-opetition (i.e. the removal of the
difficulty of monitoring operations if actors are in separate territories). The organizational, cultura  
and informational asymmetry between co-opetitors can promote opportunistic actions. The security 
aspect of the relationship remains paramount and includes possible political sanctions against co-
opetitors that are considered too individualistic.  
Violation of a collaborative agreement may trigger sanctions that are either selective or 
deployed across a wide range of markets and territories (Hemphill & Vonortas, 2003). There could 
be two reasons for this. First, the sectoral and geographic deployment of co-opetition can increase 
the vulnerability of a firm to the opportunistic action of a co-opetitor that could attack it in any of 
its competitive arenas following a collective project. As a result, the firm could establish a 
dissuasive system of sanctions to secure the relationsh p. Second, the establishment of a firm in 
several markets and territories occupied by its co-opetitors gives it the opportunity to apply 
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sanctions because of the increasing overlap of their competitive environments. Initially, increased 
contact with various members of the same extended network means the firm can better monitor the 
behavior of co-opetitors. For example, the firm may be informed of the use of technology 
developed in co-ownership under a collaborative agrement and yet be exploited by its co-opetitor 
outside the collective project for self-interested purposes. Then, the extent of the opportunity 
provides a common network with the incentive to sanctio  the co-opetitor in several of its strategic 
markets (e.g. by launching an international price war). The threat of a multi-sectoral and/or 
worldwide conflict that goes beyond the single collaborative environment discourages 
opportunism.  
In recognizing their interdependence, multi-market and multi-point competitors are open to 
mutual tolerance because everyone can win by allowing the others to dominate in certain 
environments in exchange for similar treatment for themselves in other fields or places of activity 
(Baum & Korn, 1999). This mutual tolerance emerges as a result of familiarity and deterrence. Co-
opetitors can thus protect all their gains in respon e to attacks from opponents they have in common 
and direct the competitive dynamics of their market share (Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). 
In this sense, the fear of social and economic sanctions in the face of opportunistic behavior can 
encourage co-operation (Hemphill & Vonortas, 2003). 
Hence, the following is hypothesized : 
H3 : The greater the extent of the co-opetition enviro ment, the more opportunism is 
sanctioned. 
 
The theme of this research connects the sectoral and geographic extent of co-opetition with 
the opportunism of its participants and the threat of sanctions. It is argued that the environmental 
complexity of co-opetition leads to confrontation, which was previously under control, returning. 
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An empirical study of the environment, nature and control of different relational strategies 
employed by competitors in the French marine market should enable an account and explanation 
of the peculiarities of co-opetitive exchanges. Figure 1 summarizes the links between the variables 
considered in this study, the theoretical logic applied and the assumptions presented above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Extent of co-opetition and its influence on opportunism sanctions 
 
METHOD 
 French boating market and sampling  
The majority of work on co-opetition has studied the process through the use of qualitative 
methods applied to a single firm or a small group of companies selected according to structural 
criteria (size, age, etc.). Few studies have attempted to describe and explain co-opetition via a 
quantitative method. To do this, a statistical analysis of the French boating market was performed 
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that considered eight activities (boat building, etc.). Boating companies were identified using 30 
codes from the European Classification of Economic Activities (NACE) Rev. 2. 
The research questionnaire was constructed to collect primary data around eight themes : 
the profile of the respondent and his/her firm, the reasons for collaboration, the management and 
governance of the project, the nature of the co-opetitors and their exchanges, and the extent of the 
involvement of the company in the project. The questionnaire was sent to 2,290 French boating 
companies selected using simple random sampling. This method ensured the representativeness of 
the sample : each unit in the population had an equal chance of being selected. Consistent with the 
research objectives, statistical inference thresholds were for at least 30 respondents to ensure 
descriptive analysis and a minimum of 100 respondents to ensure explanatory analysis. After 
receiving 115 responses to the survey, 106 companies were selected because of the satisfactory 
level of information provided in their questionnaires : 93% were SMEs and 85% of the respondents 
held a position of responsibility within their company. In addition, secondary data were obtained 
from three databases (Diane, FIN and boating Figaro) to measure four structural variables of the 
companies : turnover, workforce, age and group membership. Finally, statistical analysis was 
performed using SPSS and AMOS software. 
 
 Data processing 
The measurement scales were built in three stages. First, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and 
Bartlett tests were performed to ensure that the data were factorable and would allow the realization 
of principal component analysis (PCA). The KMO test measures the correlation between the 
variables with the criterion for factorization being a value of at least equal to 0.5. The Bartlett test 
verifies that the matrix of correlations is not a unit matrix. The test must have a value equal to 0. 
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Second, the Kaiser rule was mobilized to purify thefactors of each variable depending on the 
quality of their information. Only the factors having a value at least equal to 1 were kept, a value 
which indicates the degree to which the variable explains the phenomenon measured (total 
percentage of variance explained). Third, a PCA stres  test was carried out in order to strengthen 
the tri-factor for each variable. The rule of minimu  restitution selected the factors that explain at 
least 50% of the total variance of the phenomenon by the variable. 
Items were selected to calculate the best variable by calculating the squared cosine (cos²) 
or commonality. Commonality (an index positioned between 0 and 1) informs us of the level of 
consideration of an initial variable by the set of factors selected in our analysis. Applied 
individually, commonality shows the share of the information of this variable explained by each 
item. Each item was eliminated in turn if its commonality remained the lowest below the value of 
0.5 (Carricano, Poujol, & Bertrandias, 2010). The remaining items consisted of new factors that 
provided a guarantee of quality when measuring the variable. We evaluated the reliability and 
validity of the internal consistency of each variable y calculating Cronbach's alpha (see Table 2). 
Cronbach’s alpha ensures that the items correctly measure the phenonemon associated with the 
variable. Convergent validity, which ensures the correlation of all the items together, is achieved 
when the coefficient is at least equal to 0.5 (Evrard, Pras, & Roux, 2003). Finally, all these items 
correctly calculate the variable.  
To better understand the major components previously selected, five rotations were made 
for each variable component factor. Provided by the SPSS software, this factorial representation 
distinguishes the items according to their position and distance to bring together the most 
informative aspects of each factor for which they provide the most information. To improve the 
accuracy of the information provided by the factors f the global variable, the information returned 
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by each rotation was calculated and the rotation whose factor scores were best was retained. This 
representation of combinations of items guarantees an optimal measurement of the initial variable. 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to increase the reliability and validity of the measuring 
instrument was conducted through a new treatment of items. AMOS software evaluates the error 
terms in the links between latent variables and observable variables to reveal the goodness of fit 
between the empirical data and the theoretical models tested. Evrard et al. (2003) classify them 
into two groups : absolute indicators (chi-square, GFI, AFM, RMSEA and RMR) and the related 
indices (NFI, RFI, CFI, IFI and TLC) used for the CFA (see Table 2). From the factor scores 
forwarded by the PCA stress test, the correlation (weight) between the observable variables was 
calculated and provided clues to eliminate those variables with the lowest correlation. This process 
was repeated to obtain a satisfactory quality of fit between the relational structures tested and the 
data observed. After the factor analysis, there were three groups of 12 variables and 60 factors (see 
Table 2). 
Typology analysis (TA) allowed similar businesses to be organized in a finite number of 
groups. Initially, the aggregative hierarchical classification allows the selection of the number of 
groups to be retained by reading the dendrogram. Second, non-hierarchical classification (the k-
means method) improves the quality of the local rather han global classification. Based on the 
factor scores from the PCA and the CFA, the analysis of variance (ANOVA) guarantees the overall 
validity of the classification. Through the results of an F-test, the explanatory power of the factors 
and their meanings are calculated. The greater the F-value, the stronger the explanatory power. 
Finally, the results of the typology are validated by discriminant analysis (DA): this identifies a 
dependent variable (key function) that determines th  membership of a firm in a particular group. 
The quality of the group classification is validated by two indicators : Fisher's F-test and Wilks’ 
lambda. These tests verify the existence of differences between groups and identify the one or more 
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discriminating variables that allow a company to move from one group to another. Thus, five 
business groups and four discriminant functions were constructed by analyzing two groups of 
variables: "Relational modes" and "Environments and networks" (excluding institutional and 
vertical networks). The significant influence of an explanatory variable on the dependent variable 
was determined by studying variance (ANOVA). The involvement of each group with respect to 
the variables studied was raised by multiple comparison tests (MCTs): t-tests, Tukey with unequal 
group sizes, Scheffé, Bonferroni and least significant difference (LSD).  
Finally, an explanation is given of the phenomenon that led to the deployment of an 
explanatory method to measure the causal relationship between two or more variables (the 
"dependent variable" and the "independent variable") ased on the data from the sample (Evrard et 
al., 2003). A stepwise model of multiple regression was applied, which sequentially eliminates the 
independent variables which do not explain the dependent variable (F > 0.05) (Evrard et al., 2003). 
The coefficients of significant regression and determination (R/R²/R-adjusted) were held to show 
the links between two variables. Thus, the explanatory variables of "Opportunism sanctions" were 
designated by the stepwise multiple regression analysis, which incorporated the existence of five 
groups of firms. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Variables 
This work presents a range of co-opetition practices across several variables that address 
the nature, environmental dimensions and control modes of the phenomenon. To assess the 
primary data, the questionnaire mobilized nominal (market, territory, etc.) and ordinal (from 1 = 
"Do not agree at all" to 4 = "Quite in agreement") scales. The items used were mostly from research 
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gathered during the literature review. The PCA and CFA confirmed the reliability, quality and 
discriminant validity of the following variables. These variables are discussed in more detail in 
Table 2.  
To measure the response of boating companies to opportunistic co-opetitors, the 
"Opportunism sanctions" dependent variable was based on eight items from Uzzi (1997) (see 
Table 2). Sanctions can be established before and during collaboration to muzzle opportunism 
(Williamson, 1985). These sanctions are expressed through the threat of attack (e.g. launching a 
price war or a new competing offer) against an individualistic firm or through a defensive action, 
such as the threat of withdrawal by the firm injured initially (e.g. the protection of certain resources 
in collaboration or withdrawal from the project). Sanctions were approached in this study as a 
project control instrument to maintain a co-operative effort despite persistent rivalry between co-
opetitors (Hemphill & Vonortas, 2003).  
Three groups of independent variables were identifid : the nature of co-opetition, the 
environmental dimension of co-opetition, and the control of co-opetition.  
Co-opetition is a many-faceted phenomenon due to multiple balancing acts that can be 
established between competition and co-operation, given the profile of the firms, their relative 
strengths, the risks involved, etc. However, the nature of co-opetition has still not been evaluated 
due to the scarcity of research on the subject and a focus on the process. Therefore, the measure 
of the nature of co-opetition in this study mobilized 11 items taken from Powell, Koput, and Smith-
Doerr (1996) to measure the various relational modes that firms can adopt (competition, alliance, 
defense and co-opetition); eight items based on partner selection criteria (their skills, market 
position and collaborative experience); eight items taken from Young-Ybarra and Wiersema 
(1999) on trust between partners as critical in collab rative engagement; 18 items from the same 
authors on different types of asymmetry between partners that may cause opportunism (an 
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imbalance between their resources, their ability to learn, and their position and influence in the 
common environment); and, finally, 18 items created on the types of risks faced by the partners in 
a collective project (failure of a partner, loss of resources, and individualistic actions). 
The co-opetition phenomenon has still not been explored in any depth in terms of market 
analysis. Padula and Dagnino (2007) argue that co-opetition evolves within a competitive arena. 
Conversely, Luo (2007) maintains that the relationship can span different markets and territories. 
Moreover, debate persists regarding the simplicity or complexity of its networks. However, to our 
knowledge, no study seems to discuss the influence of the environment on co-opetitive approaches 
in any depth. In response to this, 10 items in relation to the sectoral and geographic dimensions of 
co-opetition were mobilized to measure the extent of the environmental dimension of co-opetition 
(a specialized or diversified market environment, a national or an international environment); 11 
items taken from Lambe, Spekman, and Hunt (2002) on the nature of the collaborative networks 
deployed by firms (vertical networks, horizontal networks of two partners, or more complex ones 
of more than two partners); seven items taken from Wiklund and Shepherd (2009) on how the 
activities of value chains may be affected by a colle tive project (logistics functions and 
production); 19 items from Young-Ybarra and Wiersema (1999) regarding the contributions and 
creation of resources between partners during a project (taken from the six categories defined by 
resource-based view [RBV] theory); 23 items based on information learning and knowledge 
partners in a project (knowledge related to their human, physical, technological, organizational 
and commercial aspects); and, finally, 16 items from Todeva and Knoke (2005) on the underlying 
impetus (i.e. whether a project is suggested or imposed) and objectives of co-opetition (an 
individual or collective defense market, strengthening a market position, pursuing personal 
projects and further technological developments). 
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Finally, scientific debate also continues on the form f control in co-opetition. The theory 
of transaction costs calls for a formal framework of co-opetition, which must consist of contractual 
and organizational tools (Williamson, 1985). Conversely, network theory recommends a more 
relational governance guide, such as the choice of partners (Padula & Dagnino, 2007). Finally, 
Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen (2009) advocate the combination of social governance and 
organizational and legal aspects. Therefore, the measur  of control in co-opetition mobilized 23 
items created regarding different collaborative project management tools (contractual agreements, 
operations reports, projects as consortiums, maintain g respect for co-operative engagement); 
four items based on Todeva and Knoke (2005) on the diff rent profiles of the project participants 
(partners, competitors and/or non-competing third parties as public actors); and, finally, 15 items 
created on the periodicity of sanctions on opportunism (at the launch, growth phase, maturity or 
decline of the project). 
Finally, the four control variables were the size of a firm (effectiveness), its turnover, the 
date the firm was established and its membership of a group. The consultation of various digital 
databases (Kompass, Diane, etc.) enabled secondary dat  to be collected for the first three variables. 
The fourth variable was an item suggested by Belderbos, Carree, Diederen, Lokshin, and Veugelers 
(2004). 
 
 Five groups of firms identified  
The scores related to the centroids are given in parentheses (G) below. "Multi-point and 
multi-market competitors" (Group 1) diversify (G = 0.906) and internationalize their activities (G 
= 0.735) through defensive relationships (G = 0.065) with their competitors that are competitive 
(G = 0.058) and complex (G = 0.284). "Mono-point and mono-market partners" (Group 2) conduct 
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a single activity (G = 1.023) in a single domestic market (G = 0.400) through collaborative 
relationships (G = 0.359) with their competitors that are defensive (G = 0.163) and dyadic (G = -
0.103). "Mono-point and mono-market co-opetitors" (Group 3) develop a single activity (G = 
0.348) in a single domestic market (G = 1.142) via co-opetitive (G = 0.137) and dyadic (G = -
0.248) relationships with their competitors. "Multi-market co-opetitors" (Group 4) diversify (G > 
1) without a dominant geographic strategy (G < 1) via co-opetitive (G = 0.626) and dyadic (G = -
0.464) relationships with their competitors. "Multi-point co-opetitors" (Group 5) internationalize 
(G > 0) without a dominant sector strategy (G < 0) through competitive (G = 0.663), defensive (G 
= 0.656), collaborative (G = 0.438), co-opetitive (G = 0.204) and complex dyadic (G = 0.295) 
relationships with their competitors. 
 
 Four discriminant functions identified  
The classification of companies into five groups presented a discriminating power of 
93.84%. According to the Fisher’s and Wilks' lambda tests, the "Mono-environment" and "Multi-
environment" variables differentiate more firms (discr minative power of 93.84%). Four 
discriminant functions were identified (discriminating power of 97.90%).  
"Co-opetition committed" (function 1) has positive scores for "Relational modes" and a 
"Complex horizontal network". This function describes the presence of co-operative but 
competitive behavior which is, therefore, opportunistic during the collective project. This co-
opetition strengthens and pools the collective actions of many "Multi-point co-opetitors" (centroid 
= 3.019).  
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"Independent co-opetition" (function 2) has negative scores for "Relational modes" and 
"Complex horizontal networks". This suggests a high degree of independence in co-opetition for 
"Mono-point and mono-market co-opetitors" (centroid = 2.373), which minimizes and sometimes 
prevents their interactions with other firms. The relationship is remote because their co-opetitive 
interdependence is low due to the lack of collective interests and individual connections between 
firms.  
A "Pooled alliance" (function 3) has positive scores for "Relational modes" (except for co-
opetition) and "Complex horizontal networks". This type of project is characterized by alternating 
co-operative and competitive relations between "Mono-point and mono-market partners" (centroid 
= 1.252) which are part of a strong common collabortive network.  
"Opportunistic co-opetition" (function 4) has positive scores for "Relational modes" and 
negative scores for "Complex horizontal networks". This type of co-opetition defines competitive 
relations and concurrent collaboration between "Multi-market co-opetitors" (centroid = 0.606) that 
adopt individualistic attitudes despite their collective commitment. On the one hand, co-operation 
gives a company access to new growth opportunities through support in conquering new 
environments. On the other, its opportunism allows it to be more competitive in these environments 
and to be more strategic in other areas. 
Opportunism sanctions are not particularly used by "Multi-point and multi-market 
competitors" and "Mono-point and mono-market partners". Their relational model is not based on 
the paradoxical simultaneity of competition and co-operation which can promote the betrayal of a 
collaborative engagement. In contrast, opportunistic behavior strongly characterizes co-opetitors 
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that develop projects in complex environments. Co-operating in several markets 
(services/products) or territories encourages opportunistic behavior. Thus, H1 is validated. 
 
Features of the opportunism sanctions of each group 
The scores relating to the centroids (G) and significance levels of the Fisher’s tests (p) are 
given here in parentheses. A significant difference (p < 0.05) is noted among the five groups 
concerning sanctions for opportunism. The groups of "Multi-market co-opetitors" (G = 2.301), 
"Multi-point co-opetitors" (1.378) and "Mono-point and mono-market co-opetitors" (0.590) have 
a positive centroid. Conversely, the groups of "Mono-point and mono-market partners" (-1.137) 
and "Multi-point and multi-market competitors" (-0.265) have negative barycenters. Thus, co-
opetition is characterized by other relational modes through the presence of actions by 
opportunistic co-opetitors which are, therefore, systematically sanctioned. Thus, H2 is validated. 
 
Determinants of opportunism sanctions 
Having distinguished the groups according to their level of co-operation, the explanations 
of the sanctions for opportunism are now analyzed. The stepwise regression model (see Table 3) 
shows "Opportunism sanctions" as the dependent variable. The response of the explanatory 
variable to opportunism is examined within each of the five groups of companies. For the sake of 
simplicity, only the statistically significant results are presented. 
For "Multi-point and multi-market competitors", the more a company reacts to 
opportunistic behavior by imposing sanctions, the more likely the company is to be part of a group 
and to have unique resources. 
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"Mono-point and mono-market co-opetitors" respond to opportunistic behavior with 
sanctions when they share a common vertical network with their competitors, when the 
environment is a multi-market one, when there are fewer third parties in the project, when fewer 
of their commitments are met during a project, and when there is less asymmetry between their 
decisions regarding technological resources. 
"Multi-market co-opetitors" respond to opportunistic behavior with sanctions when multi-
market co-opetitors  have a defensive strategy, when t y develop knowledge related to human and 
physical resources, when they create technological resources, when they invest technological 
resources in a project, and when they learn strategic information. 
"Mono-point and mono-market partners” respond to opportunistic behavior with sanctions 
when the environment is a multi-market one, when they prepare multi-point and multi-market 
sanctions upon the maturity of a project, when they invest technology resources in a project, and 
when they can learn less about the capabilities of their rivals.  
"Multi-point co-opetitors" respond to opportunistic behavior with sanctions when multi-
point co-opetitors prepare multi-point and multi-market sanctions at the maturity of a project, and 
when the asymmetry between the technological resources of multi-point co-opetitors is less. 
In light of the above, H3 is validated. The increasing scope of co-opetition is accompanied 
by a sanctions mechanism. 
 
 DISCUSSION  
Are opportunism sanctions developed particularly during co-opetition? This empirical 
study of the nature, environment and control of different relational modes employed by competitors 
in the French boating market has allowed the specifics of their co-opetitive exchanges to be 
revealed. The descriptive and explanatory analyses of the phenomenon and its sectoral and/or 
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territorial dimension provide three major findings on the role of sanctions against opportunism 
faced during precarious co-opetition. 
The first result reveals the presence, which was not a ticipated, of five business groups 
according to the environment, the degree of their collaborative engagement and their preparations 
for opportunism. 
Competitors develop an offensive policy of sectoral and territorial expansion to increase 
their sphere of influence (Baum & Korn, 1999). The asymmetry of resources between diverse and 
global adversaries favors the emergence of mutual tolerance through their ability to strengthen their 
domination over their main strategic market and increase their multi-market contacts to act as a 
deterrent. 
Partners apply a local specialization policy through the alternation of collaborative and 
competitive relationships with some of their rivals, which is inserted into a simple collaborative 
network (i.e. a dyadic relationship between two rival firms). In this form of agreement, rivalry gives 
way to co-operation so that everyone can improve a competitive position through a shared effort. 
However, this relational structure systematically reverts to confrontation. Therefore, the 
environment is familiar and made trustworthy and stable in order to secure the alliance. 
Co-opetition is plural (Gnyawali & Park, 2009): it rests upon the existence of three groups 
of co-opetitors. First, some co-opetitors specialize locally with the support of a simple collaborative 
network. These firms are characterized by strong relational independence in co-opetition with no 
strategic incentive towards opportunistic behavior and, as a result, no incentive to retaliate. Second, 
some co-opetitors also rely on a single collaborative network in order to diversify. Co-opetition 
allows them access to heterogeneous resources and skills that are necessary for their establishment 
in new target areas for two reasons: the growth prospects of the target areas and their occupation 
by certain of the firm’s competitors. Co-opetitors’ settlement in the strategic markets of their rivals 
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will ensure security for them in an otherwise competitiv  environment. Third, internationalized co-
opetitors develop a complex collaborative network involving multiple competitors. Their historical 
presence in a common domestic market promotes their proximity during the project and their ability 
to punish any local or global opportunistic action. 
The results confirm the use of sanctions against firms that are aggressive in co-opetition. 
Offensive intentions promote opportunism in collaborative work. In response, co-opetitors adopt 
defensive sanctions through a mechanism that is established and used in addition to the contractual 
framework. 
The study also reveals that reactions to opportunism remain disparate, depending on the 
relational modes between established competitors. The use of sanctions is particularly marked in 
the simultaneity of collaboration and competition that favors the appearance of opportunism. 
Conversely, sanctions are not deployed in an alliance that is based exclusively on a collaborative 
relationship. 
Finally, it is accepted that the scope of co-opetition is associated with the preparation and 
deployment of sanctions. The growing scope of a joint project can be dangerous if it is not 
controlled (Oxley & Sampson, 2004). The defensive attitude of co-opetitors is reinforced in multi-
market and multi-project deployment, which results in the use of sanctions as a mechanism in 
multiple areas and territories shared by rivals. 
The second result reveals three discriminant functio s, whereby co-opetition can be 
independent, engaged or opportunistic. Committed or opportunistic co-opetition is characterized 
by the strong internationalization and diversification of a project. The involvement of multiple 
markets leads to strong rivalry between co-opetitors (Luo, 2007). However, the failure of their 
collaboration is likely to unbalance their large-scale competitive relationship. Therefore, the 
environmental complexity of co-opetition is mostly controlled by the preparation and use of 
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dissuasive sanctions against aggressive firms. Furthermore, the sharing of markets among several 
co-opetitors promotes the efficiency of such a mechanism. Each time a firm enters the strategic 
markets of its co-opetitors, an opportunity is provided for it to convince its co-opetitors of their 
interdependence and their mutual interest in respecting their collaborative commitments. 
The third result shows the determinants of opportunism sanctions. These are outlined in the 
stepwise multiple regression model. The growing strategic importance of co-opetition is a factor in 
the preparation and application of sanctions. Thus, sanctions in various markets and territories are 
often deployed in the phase in which the collaborati n reaches maturity. There are several reasons 
for this. First, opportunistic behavior allows a firm to obtain value from collaborative work 
undertaken over the long term. Long-standing collabr tion creates a high degree of value, which 
can be lost to opportunistic behavior. Therefore, punitive actions are enacted at the maturity of the 
project. Second, these sanctions are facilitated when an initial asymmetry between co-opetitors is 
erased by the distribution of collaborative gains. Co-opetition gradually strengthens the competitive 
position of firms in shared markets and territories. Their ability to oppose opportunism is thus 
enhanced as a result of gains emanating from the sustainability of their co-operation with their 
competitors. Thus, the more time that is spent on collaborative work, the more likely it is that the 
exploitation of collaborative engagements will result in a response from actors who are now in a 
position to punish this behavior. Finally, the extensive damage caused by the abandonment of a 
historic collaboration during the competitive actions of rivals is also likely to provoke a strong 
reaction against opportunism on the part of the injured firms. 
The environmental complexity of co-opetition is, therefore, another important factor in 
opportunism sanctions. Multi-market projects in particular are accompanied by the preparation and 
implementation of sanctions. First, the environmental complexity of co-opetition does not 
encourage the kind of familiarity and proximity necessary to facilitate collaboration and limit the 
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use of sanctions. Second, the fear of opportunism and its consequences reinforces the apprehension 
of competitors, which results in the development of a deterrent mechanism in the form of sanctions. 
Third, the complex environment of co-opetition gives firms the arsenal necessary to guard against 
attack. The adoption of defensive postures is another particularly strong determinant of 
opportunism sanctions as part of a diversified co-opetition. Co-opetition is used by firms to protect 
the competitive positions they have acquired collectiv ly, rather than to withdraw from them. 
Previous results from this research concluded that managers need to pay particular attention 
to the dual nature of co-opetition when the project spans multiple markets and territories. Various 
factors may cause the opportunism of co-opetitors, such as remoteness (physical, organizational, 
cultural, etc.) or the desire to increase their competitiveness on a large scale. In such a context, a 
sanction system is recommended for three reasons : t  deter opportunism in upstream collaboration, 
to regulate competitive and collaborative relationship  during a project and, finally, to punish when 
the collective commitment is not respected by one of the co-opetitors. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 This research reinforces the analysis of co-opetition as a plural phenomenon characterized 
by, among others, the omnipresence of opportunistic risk during its practice (Gnyawali & Park, 
2009; Oxley & Sampson, 2004). Faced with this threat, the results confirm that a dissuasive 
sanction system is built and applied in order to punish individualistic action during collaboration. 
The study indicates that the preparation and application of sanctions in the face of opportunism is 
particularly present in a complex co-opetition environment. Internationalization and 
diversification, particularly co-opetition, involve the preparation of a defensive system. This 
system ensures the presence of a deterrent in the strat gic markets and territories facilitated by 
collaborative work. This preventive policy was affirmed by the findings, which emphasize the high 
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frequency of individualistic behaviors among multiple remote opponents, which, in turn, result in 
the application of multi-market and multi-point sanctions on the part of the injured firms. 
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TABLES  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Dependent variable : 
Opportunism sanctions 
Items 
Attack 
mono-market 
Attack  
multi-market 
Attack  
mono-point 
Attack  
multi-point 
Defense 
mono-market 
Defense  
multi-market 
Defense  
mono-point 
Defense  
multi-point 
Attack mono-market 1        
Attack multi-market 0.274 1       
Attack mono-point 0.624 0.513 1      
Attack multi-point 0.384 0.474 0.497 1     
Defense mono-market 0.489 0.327 0.458 0.208 1    
Defense multi-market 0.234 0.503 0.373 0.382 0.573 1   
Defense mono-point 0.383 0.303 0.576 0.287 0.762 0.543 1  
Defense multi-point 0.158 0.331 0.348 0.575 0.368 0.643 0.492 1 
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Table 2. Principal component analysis and confirmatory factor analysis 
Variables Factors FAS α χ2 χ2/ddl RMSEA NFI  RFI  CFI  IFI  TLI  
 
Opportunism sanctions  Opportunism sanctions  
PCA 0.859  
Relational modes Competition 
CFA 
0.816 
0.72 60.966 (*) 1.604 0.076 0.826 0.698 0.919 0.927 0.860 
Alliance 0.730 
Defense 0.631 
Co-opetition 0.604 
Environments & networks 
Mono-environment 
 
Multi-environment 
 
Collaborative network 
Mono-point environment 
PCA 
0.850 
0.636  
Mono-market environment 0.671 
Multi -point environment 
CFA 
0.850 
0.636 4.822 (*) 1.205 0.044 0.972 0.894 0.995 0.995 0.980 
Multi -market environment 0.671 
Institutional network 
PCA 
0.860 
0.617 
 
  
Complex horizontal network 0.752 
Vertical network 0.688 
Asymmetries Asymmetry between partners PCA 0.854 
Knowledge asymetry PCA 0.637 
Managerial resources asymmetry 
CFA 
0.618 
0.649 4.059 (*) 1.014 0.012 0.883 0.563 0.997 0.998 0.989 
Technological resources asymmetry 0.489 
Decisions asymetry PCA 0.721  
Resources 
Resources input 
 
 
 
Creation of resources 
 
 
Characteristics of resources 
Commercial resources input 
CFA 
0.803 
0.555 33.339 (*) 1.587 0.075 0.786 0.633 0.897 0.908 .823 
Technological resources input 0.593 
Organizational resources input 0.641 
Human resources input 0.534 
Technological resources creation 
CFA 
0.730 
0.677 14.091 (*) 1.281 0.052 0.934 0.873 0.984 0.985 0.969 Financial resources creation 0.768 
Organizational resources creation 0.728 
Unique resources PCA 0.735  
Activities Business production activities 
CFA 
0.771 
0.835 18.106 (*) 1.392 0.061 0.939 0.868 0.981 0.982 0.959 
Business distribution activities 0.856 
Characteristics of information 
PCA 
0.927 
0.583 
 
 Information management 0.602 
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Learning 
      Information learning 
 
 
      Knowledge learning 
Human and physical knowledge development 
PCA 
0.803 
0.785 
 
 
 
  
Technological development 0.773 
Organizational development 0.760 
Commercial development 0.725 
Development of partners’ capabilities  0.602 
Trust Trust PCA 0.95 
Risks Default risk PCA 0.875 
Opportunistic risk PCA 0.937 
Resource risk PCA 0.902 
FAS = factor analyses selected; PCA = principal factor analysis; CFA = confirmatory factor analysis; * = p < 0.05; α: = Cronbach’s alpha; χ2 = Chi-square; χ2/ddl = Chi-square/degrees 
of freedom 
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Variables Factors FAS α χ2 χ2/ddl RMSEA NFI  RFI  CFI  IFI  TLI  
Initiative & objectives 
Initiative 
 
Objectives 
Imposed collaboration 
CFA 
0.778 
0.668 0.822 (*) 0.822 0.001 0.994 0.962 1 1.001 1.009 
Suggested collaboration 0.804 
Personal market defense 
PCA 
0.695 
0.701 
  
Strengthening market presence 0.595 
Pursuing personal projects  0.647 
Pursuing technological developments 0.556 
Collective market defense 0.412 
Choice of partners Choice by market 
PCA 
0.758 
0.689 Choice by competences 0.555 
Choice by collaborative experiences 0.513 
Control of co-opetition 
Forms 
 
 
 
 
Composition 
Contractualization of the collaborative relationship 
CFA 
0.936 
0.930 400.738 (*) 1.821 0.088 0.785 0.731 0.886 0.890 0.857 
Contractualization of the project 0.921 
Consortium 0.677 
Collaborative control 0.810 
Compliance 0.783 
External stakeholders 
CFA 
0.754 
0.565 0.690 (*) 0.690 0.001 0.883 0.563 0.997 0.998 0.989 
Internal stakeholders 0.622 
Sanctions period Multi -market sanction upon the decline of the project 
CFA 
0.848 
0.578 30.911(*) 1.636 0.078 0.810 0.715 0.911 0.916 0.866 
Multi -market & multi-point sanction upon the maturity of the project 0.795 
Multi -market & multi-point sanction upon the growth of the project 0.757 
Multi -market & multi-point sanction upon the launch of the project 0.787 
Mono-market & mono-point sanction upon the launch of the project 0.829 
FAS = factor analyses selected; PCA = principal factor analysis; CFA = confirmatory factor analysis; * = p < 0.05; α = Cronbach’s alpha; χ2 = Chi-square; χ2/ddl = Chi-square/degrees of freedom 
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Table 3. Stepwise regression 
Dependent variable :  
Opportunism sanctions 
Multi-point and 
multi-market competitors 
Mono-point and 
mono-market partners 
Mono-point and 
mono-market co-opetitors 
Multi-market  
co-opetitors 
Multi-point 
co-opetitors 
B(sig.t) Err. std. Beta B(sig.t) Err. std. Beta B(sig.t) Err. std. Beta B(sig.t) Err. std. Beta B(sig.t) Err. std. Beta 
Constants -1.439(*) 0.607  10.07(*) 4.591  -0.011(ns) 0.031  0.181(ns) 0.142  1.073(***) 0.243  
Strategic information learning       0.148(**) 0.031 0.136       
Human and physical knowledge learning       0.302(***) 0.022 0.314       
Knowledge related to learning capacity of partners          -0.429(**) 0.129 -0.44    
Asymmetry of technological resources             -1.753(***) 0.418 -0.6 
Asymmetry of managerial decisions       -0.117(*) 0.036 -0.1       
Project composition: the presence of external actors 
(third parties) 
   -0.206(*) 0.071 -0.285 -0.212(***) 0.031 -0.22       
Multi -market environment    9.161(*) 4.022 0.262    0.816(***) 0.18 0.602    
Compliance with commitments during the project    -0.533(***) 0.1 -0.613          
Objective: single defense market       0.483(***) 0.031 0.523       
Vertical collaborative network    0.657(***) 0.086 0.974          
Contribution of technological resources       0.181(**) 0.042 0.15 0.348(*) 0.124 0.371    
Resources firm estimated as unique 0.451(*) 0.173 0.41             
Defensive relationship       0.891(***) 0.036 0.909       
Creation of technological resources       0.261(***) 0.033 0.2       
Multi-market and multi-point sanction at the maturity 
of the project 
         0.4(*) 0.155 0.345 0.318(**) 0.102 0.439 
Membership of the firm of a group 0.947(*) 0.346 0.43             
R/R²/R² aj. 0.678/0.459/0.414 0.932/0.869/0.822 0.997/0.995/0.992 0.892/0.797/0.729 0.775/0.601/0.562 
Fisher’s tests 10.214(***) 18.636(***) 279.234(***) 11.785(***) 15.118(***) 
*** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.01; * = p < 0.05; ns = not significant 
 
 
